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Editorial on the Research Topic
Judgment and Decision Making Under Uncertainty: Descriptive, Normative, and
Prescriptive Perspectives
Judgment and Decision Making Under Uncertainty: Descriptive, Normative, and Prescriptive
Perspectives was motivated by our interest in better understanding why people judge and decide
as they do (descriptive perspective), how they ideally ought to judge and decide (normative
perspective), and how their judgment and decision-making processes might be improved in
practice (prescriptive perspective). We sought papers that addressed some aspect of judgment
and decision making from one or more of these three theoretical perspectives. We further sought
contributions that examined judgment and decision making under conditions of uncertainty,
which we intentionally left loosely defined. Our focus on uncertainty reflects the fact that the vast
majority of decisions people make in life are not made under conditions of complete certainty,
and the uncertainties may be more or less well-defined. Indeed, different components of a single
judgment or decision may have multiple uncertainties associated with it, some of which may be
fuzzier than others. Following our call for papers, we received 32 submissions, 17 of which were
accepted. The latter set comprises this book. There are 11 original research articles, 2 hypothesis
and theory articles, 2 perspectives, and 1 book review and systematic review each.
This book, the culmination of a Frontiers in Psychology Cognition section Research Topic,
is closely related to an earlier Research Topic and book entitled Improving Bayesian Reasoning:
What Works and Why that two of us edited (Navarrete and Mandel, 2016). The current book
shows strong continuity with its conceptual cousin. Several papers address aspects of Bayesian
judgment or reasoning. In “Why can only 24% solve Bayesian reasoning problems in natural
frequencies: Frequency phobia in spite of probability blindness,” Weber et al. find that, despite
the benefit to accuracy conferred by representing statistical information in natural frequencies,
many participants translate natural frequencies back into probabilities. This appears to be an
important factor in explaining the low rates of accurate judgment. In “How to improve performance
in Bayesian inference tasks: A comparison of five visualizations,” Böcherer-Linder and Eichler
investigate the effectiveness of three graphical properties of visualizations: area-proportionality,
use of discrete and countable statistical entities, and graphical transparency of the nested-sets
structure. They find that the primary factor contributing to performance in Bayesian reasoning
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problems was graphically representing the nested-set structure
of the problem in a transparent manner, followed secondarily
by representing discrete objects. In “What eye-tracking can tell
us on statistical reasoning—An empirical study on tree diagrams
and 2× 2 tables,” Bruckmaier et al. use eye tracking to shed light
on the reasons for errors in probabilistic judgment. They show
that different reasoning processes can account for errors that look
similar behaviorally. Conversely, errors that look different may
stem from common reasoning processes. In “Bayesian revision
vs. information distortion,” Russo explains how a normative
requirement of Bayesian reasoning—namely, that likelihoods
should be independent of the prior probability—is routinely
violated in all but the most contrived judgment problems where
such violations are designed to be impossible. The violations,
Russo argues, occur because people strive for coherence and
therefore seek to bring new evidence in line with their prior
beliefs. Evidently, the pursuit of coherence can at times signal
its downfall. Finally, in “Metacognitive myopia in hidden-profile
tasks: the failure to control for repetition biases,” Fiedler et al.
address an issue that is conceptually related to updating processes
when confronting correlated evidence. They find that mere
repetition of information over time (which can be thought of as
a form of correlated evidence) can undermine the optimal use of
information that is distributed across members of a collective. As
they aptly point out, given the vast opportunities for information
repetition to trigger such biases, it is vital that metacognitive
monitoring takes place, and yet their results indicate that people
have a difficult time doing so.
A second set of papers tackles uncertainty from several fresh
vantage points. In “The psychology of uncertainty and three-
valued tables,” Baratgin et al. examine people’s three-valued
(i.e., certainly true, certainly false, or neither) truth tables for
several natural language connectives. Comparing multiple three-
valued logics, they find that de Finetti’s (1936/1995) three-valued
system provides the best descriptive model. Their work on the
de Finettian “Level 1,” in which uncertainty is distinguished
from certain states, represents a long neglected bridge between
Level 0 (binary logic) and Level 2 (studies of probability
judgment in which uncertainty is quantified). In “Imprecise
uncertain reasoning: a distributional approach,” Kleiter develops
an approach to using mental probability logic in concert with
beta distributions, copulas, vines, and stochastic simulation to
model imprecise and uncertain reasoning. A key finding from
his analysis of several classic judgment problems is that the
probabilities inferred from different logical inference forms
can be so close as to make their distinction impossible in
psychological research, a result that has striking implications for
the interpretation of evidence in judgment research. In “The role
of type and source of uncertainty on the processing of climate
models projections,” Benjamin and Budescu examine how
people’s interpretations of climate change forecasts frommultiple
experts are influenced by two sources of uncertainty: imprecision
(i.e., the width of the confidence interval around a single
estimate) and conflict (the extent to which experts disagree). They
find that participants were more averse to conflict and reacted
more positively to communications that reflect imprecision.
Their results show that people’s perceptions of competing
climate change forecasts are affected by a complex interaction
between sources of uncertainty and task characteristics. This
set of papers is nicely rounded out by Mousavi’s book review
of Machina and Viscusi’s Handbook of the Economics of Risk
and Uncertainty.
A third set of papers addresses topics in decision-making
under uncertainty. In “Meta-analytic evidence for a reversal
learning effect on the Iowa Gambling Task in older adults,”
Pasion et al. report a systematic review of studies examining
older-adult decision-making on the Iowa Gambling Task. They
find evidence of a significant reversal learning effect across
blocks of the task, which suggests that older adults show
adaptive decision making as they gain experience with the
outcomes. In “Cognitive style and frame susceptibility in decision
making,” Mandel and Kapler examine the predictive effect of
several cognitive style and performance measures on frame
susceptibility or “going with the frame.” They do not find
such factors to be predictive of frame susceptibility and they
question the theoretical claim that individuals who are prone
to a less deliberate, or more intuitive, thinking style are more
susceptible to framing effects. In “Too worried to judge: On the
role of perceived severity in medical decision-making,” Colomé
et al. examine content effects on recommendations for medical
treatments. They find that worry affects recommendations only
in the higher severity context (cancer), whereas consideration
of disease likelihood given a positive test result played a
greater role in the lower severity context (hypertension). In
“The reciprocal relationships between escalation, anger, and
confidence in investment decisions over time,” Jackson et al.
show in an escalation of commitment task, where money
had to be invested in different rounds in a never-ending
project, people tend to escalate through all rounds. However,
as they do, their confidence decreases and anger increases,
thus shedding light on the experiential side of this well-
documented phenomenon. In “Does fear increase search effort
in more numerate people? An experimental study investigating
information acquisition in a decision from experience task,”
Traczyk et al. examine the role of numeracy and emotion of fear
on search policy and choice in a decision from experience task.
Both numeracy and fear were related to increased information
sampling, although the effect of fear was restricted to a
more numerate subsample. Their results shed light on the
interaction between numeracy and integral emotion in decisions
from experience.
Last but not least, three papers draw on decision science
to shed light on professional practices in forensics and
national security intelligence. In “Decisional dimensions in
expert witness testimony—a structural analysis,” Biedermann
and Kotsoglou integrate decision theory with current practices
in forensic science for the use of expert witness testimony.
The authors review current theoretical understanding of the
expert witness testimony process and then discuss a decision-
theoretic framework including real-world examples. In “Better
together: reliable application of the post-9/11 and post-Iraq
US intelligence tradecraft standards requires collective analysis,”
Marcoci et al. turn their attention to the US intelligence
community’s analytic tradecraft standards by asking whether
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raters can interpret the standards reliably as they pertain to
intelligence products. Overall, the reliability of single raters was
poor. Having important prescriptive implications for quality
control within the intelligence community, Marcoci et al. find
that a group of three or more raters is needed to provide
reliable assessments of the quality of intelligence products.
Finally, in “Correcting judgment correctives in national security
intelligence,” Mandel and Tetlock argue that the intelligence
community’s prescriptions for improving analysts’ intelligence
assessments—namely, their judgments under uncertainty—
could be substantially improved by scientifically testing the
effectiveness of proposed methods; something rarely done.
Drawing on decision science, Mandel and Tetlock argue that
current methods might not only fail to improve analysts’
judgments, they may in fact be making intelligence assessments
less reliable, coherent and accurate.
We hope the reader will find this book informative, thought
provoking, and of practical and theoretical value.
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